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The strategy of the Gulf monarchies—linking their security to Western protection by hosting numerous U.S. military bases—is backfiring in the wake of the offensive against Iran. It places them on the front lines of a war they have done everything to avoid. In this context, they may be forced to rethink their entire security model.
The Israeli-American war launched against Iran on February 28, 2026, did not come as a real surprise to the Gulf monarchies, given the massive U.S. armada mobilized in the region. However, despite the diplomatic means deployed to prevent it, the monarchies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—notably Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Qatar—are reaching the bitter conclusion that they are not being heard by their American ally. This situation fuels their anxiety, as they now fear having to manage, alone and in the long term, the chaotic consequences of a conflict imposed upon them. This massive military offensive was primarily desired by Israel, dragging in its wake a Trump administration that has become accustomed to a « double game »: engaging in negotiations while ultimately prioritizing the military option. This pattern had already manifested during the « Twelve-Day War » in June 2025 and is repeating today.
This Third Gulf War differs from the previous two. The first (1980–1988) pitted Saddam Hussein’s Iraq against Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s Iran. The second began following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and ended between January 17 and February 27, 1991. This third war sets the entire region ablaze: from Iran to Iraq and Jordan, while placing the Arabian Peninsula at the heart of the confrontation—with the notable exception of Yemen, where the Houthis remain in ambush for now. The Near East is also directly involved, with Israel and Lebanon, the latter being plunged back into war following Hezbollah missile strikes aimed at avenging the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
This new conflict aligns more closely with the legacy of the Iraq War launched on March 20, 2003, by the George W. Bush administration—a unilateral intervention conducted outside the UN legal framework, much like the current conflict. However, the repercussions of this new war could prove deeper, particularly regarding the redefinition of the regional security architecture. Everything indicates that the strategic balance of the Gulf and the wider Near East could emerge profoundly transformed.
A Military Offensive with Uncertain Objectives
The first massive Israeli-American bombings in Iran occurred while negotiations were still being held through Omani mediation. A diplomatic breakthrough under Oman’s aegis was even within reach. A compromise was taking shape around a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, based on the transfer of enriched uranium to a third country and a cap on enrichment at 2%, compared to 3.67% in the 2015 agreement.
Subsequently, Donald Trump reneged on this objective, claiming the intervention instead aimed to dismantle Iran’s ballistic program and prevent an imminent nuclear threat—a claim denied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In a third phase, following the lead of the Israeli Prime Minister, President Trump mentioned the possibility of encouraging a ground offensive led by the Iranian Kurdish community taking refuge in Iraqi Kurdistan. This hypothesis is widely judged unrealistic by military experts, due to both operational constraints and uncertainty regarding the willingness of Kurds—or other Iranian minorities such as Baluchis, Azeris, or the Arabs of Khuzestan—to engage in such an adventure.
The Israeli strategy follows a logic of fragmenting the country and weakening the Iranian security apparatus to the maximum, consistent with its global strategy of regional fragmentation to sow chaos and better impose military supremacy.
The Trump administration’s lack of a strategic compass is causing deep concern among Gulf leaders. This is often expressed indirectly through academic figures or influential business actors. In the United Arab Emirates, an open letter addressed to President Trump by businessman Khalaf Ahmad Al Habtoor, published on March 5, provides a striking illustration. In the text, he questions Washington on why the region was transformed into a battlefield even after Gulf states warned of the chaotic consequences such a war would entail.
In response to the offensive, Iran quickly retaliated with a series of high-intensity strikes targeting U.S. military installations across the region. Strikes hit bases in Jordan, Iraq, and especially in GCC member monarchies. The command facilities of the U.S. Fifth Fleet stationed in Manama, Bahrain, suffered significant damage. In Qatar, two advanced radar systems were destroyed at the Al-Udeid base, which houses the U.S. Central Command for the region (US CENTCOM). These radars play an essential role in missile detection and alerting missile defense systems, notably THAAD and Patriot batteries. Bases in Kuwait, where the U.S. military has prepositioned equipment at Camp Arifjan (hosting CENTCOM’s Land component) and Ali Al Salem Air Base, sustained serious damage. Finally, the Al-Dhafra Air Base in Abu Dhabi was targeted, as were several U.S. installations in Iraqi Kurdistan and Jordan, and the Prince Sultan Air Base in Al-Kharj, located on the outskirts of Riyadh.
Monarchies at the Heart of Retaliation
The Gulf monarchies knew they would be on the front lines in the event of a direct confrontation between Iran, the U.S., and Israel. Iranian authorities had warned them repeatedly—despite the détente observed since Riyadh restored diplomatic relations with Tehran under Beijing’s auspices on March 10, 2023—that the numerous U.S. military bases on their territory would constitute priority targets in the event of an attack on the Islamic Republic.
Economic targets have also been hit, particularly in the UAE. These include international airports—such as Dubai International (DXB) and Al Maktoum International—and strategic port facilities like Jebel Ali in Dubai, Port Zayed (near the French joint base), and Khalifa Port in Abu Dhabi.
The UAE federation is the primary target for Iranian drone and ballistic missile attacks, according to the X account of Yemeni researcher Ibrahim Jalal, who regularly publishes a count of Iran’s attacks on Gulf monarchies.
On March 7, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, in a speech broadcast on state television, apologized to neighboring countries for the strikes targeting them since the start of the war. He stated that Iran only targets its neighbors when it has first been attacked from those same countries. However, this declaration did not prevent the Revolutionary Guard Corps from continuing strikes, which may indicate an « excess of zeal » by radical elements compared to the transitional political leadership. Nevertheless, Gulf leaders are not fooled by this double discourse, which they label « smile diplomacy » when Iran engages in negotiations and « interventionist » when it activates its regional proxies.
Punishing Abu Dhabi
The death of the Supreme Leader, killed in Israeli strikes during the first hours of the conflict, convinced Iranian authorities to avenge his « martyrdom. » In this logic, the Islamic Republic chose to concentrate a significant portion of its retaliation on the United Arab Emirates, even before Israel.
For Tehran, Abu Dhabi is paying the price for its strategic choice to bet on a security rapprochement with Israel, initiated with the signing of the Abraham Accords on September 15, 2020. This rapprochement intensified even after the October 7, 2023 attacks and the regional war waged by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on several fronts. In this context, Abu Dhabi developed close cooperation with Tel Aviv in security, intelligence, and cyber sectors.
Despite the devastating war in Gaza, trade between the UAE and Israel continued to grow through 2024. The Iranian strategy now consists of directly striking the Emirati economic model—the central pillar of its soft power and international attractiveness. Numerous videos on social media show explosions near iconic tourist sites in Dubai, as well as bombs targeting strategic infrastructure.
Beyond the significant economic damage, these attacks could have lasting consequences on the federation’s international image and political conduct. The bitterness of Emirati leaders is sharpened by their reproach of the Trump administration’s lack of strategy, as well as their frustration with their Israeli partner. The latter circulated false information via the Yedioth Ahronoth (Ynet) website attributing a strike on a desalination plant in Iran to the UAE—information immediately denied on March 8 on X by Ali Al-Nuaimi, Chairman of the Defense, Interior, and Foreign Affairs Committee of the UAE Federal National Council.
The UAE federation thus finds itself trapped in the gears of a war it did not choose. Its U.S. and Israeli allies have not hesitated to compromise its de-escalation efforts by allowing information to circulate suggesting direct Gulf involvement in attacks against Iranian strategic facilities.
A Regional Security Architecture to be Reinvented
This Third Gulf War marks a major rupture in the history of regional security architecture. For decades, this architecture relied essentially on the U.S. security guarantee granted to the monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula. This strategy, which has largely failed, now seems to be questioned by the elites of these countries.
Gulf leaders, who linked their security to Western protection, now observe that these installations serve primarily to support Israeli military operations. This feeds a growing concern: that the ammunition stocks necessary for their own missile defense systems will be exhausted, while Israeli needs appear to be given priority.
Under these conditions, the Israeli-American bet on reshaping the region through military supremacy alone appears unlikely to provide a foundation for lasting security. The ambition to expand the Abraham Accords is now obsolete. These accords failed to reduce the structural tensions of the Near East, particularly in the absence of a credible political solution to the Palestinian statehood question.
The contours of a new regional architecture may gradually emerge around a balance of power between the region’s most resilient states. Saudi Arabia would constitute the political backbone, in coordination with Turkey and Egypt, while the Sultanate of Oman would continue to play a central role as a diplomatic mediator. Conversely, the smaller Gulf states—including Qatar and the UAE—would see their influence diminish. These countries, which long sought to project power beyond their size, are now hitting the structural limits of geostrategic constraints.
These states will have no choice but to insert themselves further into the regional dynamics currently driven by Saudi Arabia. Since the October 7, 2023 attacks, Riyadh seems to be seeking to build a new strategic balance by coordinating more closely with Turkey and Egypt, while strengthening its military cooperation with Pakistan to counter Israeli military supremacy.
In this context, the GCC finds itself caught between two antagonistic poles: an Israeli military hegemon reinforced by U.S. support on one side, and an Iran that retains the capacity to durably disrupt the regional balance on the other. This is why the Gulf states have every interest in staying out of the conflict triggered by Israel and the United States. Once the war ends, they know they will have to manage the regional consequences and the evolution of an Iranian neighbor whose future remains profoundly blurred.
Fatiha Dazi-Héni Researcher specialized in Gulf monarchies at the Institute for Strategic Research of the Military School (IRSEM) and teacher at Sciences Po Lille.
Source : Orient XXI
