In October, Security Council members will receive a briefing in consultations on the Secretary-General’s annual report on the situation in Western Sahara. Special Representative for Western Sahara and Head of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) Alexander Ivanko and Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara Staffan de Mistura are the anticipated briefers.
The Council is also expected to vote on a resolution to renew the mandate of MINURSO, which expires on 31 October.
Key Recent Developments
Resolution 2797 of 31 October 2025, which extended MINURSO’s mandate for another year, expressed the Council’s full support for the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy in facilitating and conducting negotiations, taking Morocco’s autonomy proposal as a basis, aimed at achieving a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable resolution of the dispute. (The plan, which Morocco submitted to the UN in 2007, calls for integrating the territory into Morocco, with the Sahrawi people managing their internal affairs while being represented externally by Morocco.) The resolution also called on the parties to engage in discussions without preconditions, using the proposal as a basis, with a view to reaching a final and mutually acceptable political solution that provides for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, and recognises that genuine autonomy could represent a feasible outcome. (For background and more information, see the brief on Western Sahara in our October 2025 Monthly Forecast and our 31 October 2025 What’s in Blue story.)
In February, the US convened ministerial-level delegations from Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, and the Polisario Front for talks in Madrid. US Permanent Representative to the UN Mike Waltz and US Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs Massad Boulos participated in the meeting, alongside de Mistura. The meeting marked the first time since 2019 that representatives of all four stakeholders had met in person in this format. Following the Madrid meeting, the US hosted the four delegations in Washington, DC, for another round of talks on 23 and 24 February.
Despite those meetings, there has been no progress towards narrowing the parties’ differences. Morocco continues to maintain that a settlement should be based on autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty, while the Polisario Front insists that any solution must guarantee the Sahrawi people’s right to self-determination. (For background and more information, see the brief on Western Sahara in our April 2026 Monthly Forecast.)
Resolution 2797 requested the Secretary-General to provide a strategic review of MINURSO’s future mandate, taking into account the outcome of the negotiations between parties within six months (that is, by the end of April). During Council members’ 23 April closed consultations on MINURSO, Asif Khan, Director of the Policy and Mediation Division in the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), briefed on the strategic review. Khan apparently provided an update, as the review had not yet been finalised. The update apparently outlined options for realigning MINURSO’s tasks and priorities in the event of a political agreement, including monitoring, observing, and reporting on a ceasefire; facilitating the return of refugees; supporting a disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) process; or supporting the exercise of the right to self-determination.
The situation on the ground remains tense, characterised by ongoing hostilities between Morocco and the Polisario Front. On 5 May, three rockets struck near the city of Smara, in Moroccan-administered Western Sahara, reportedly landing in areas near the local prison and cemetery and injuring one civilian. The Polisario Front subsequently claimed responsibility for the attack.
The attack drew condemnation from several states and regional organisations, including the Council’s P3 members (France, the UK, and the US), the European Union (EU), and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). MINURSO also expressed deep concern over incidents of firing in civilian areas. De Mistura echoed these concerns, urging the parties to avoid any action that could jeopardise the ongoing political process.
On 7 June, a reported Moroccan drone strike in the Mijek area, east of the berm, killed prominent Polisario figure Lahbib Mohamed Abdelaziz and two other Polisario members. (The berm, an approximately 1,700-mile-long earthen wall, separates the Moroccan-administered part of Western Sahara from territory controlled by the Polisario Front.) Le Monde, citing the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO), reported that the UN had received information about a drone strike targeting a Polisario military vehicle in the area.
De Mistura continued his diplomatic efforts in a bid to advance the political process. On 7 and 8 June, he travelled to the Sahrawi refugee camps near Tindouf, Algeria, where he met Polisario Front Secretary-General Brahim Ghali and other senior Sahrawi leadership members, as well as representatives of Sahrawi women’s, youth and human rights organisations. Discussions reportedly focused on the current state of the UN-sponsored political process and its prospects following the rounds of talks held earlier this year.
On 11 June, de Mistura met Boulos on the margins of the Oslo Forum. In a post on X, Boulos said that the discussions focused on advancing implementation of resolution 2797 and support the parties in reaching a “just, lasting and mutually acceptable” political solution. On 15 June, de Mistura met Algerian Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf in Algiers as part of his regional consultations. He subsequently travelled to Nouakchott, where he met Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Cheikh El Ghazouani on 18 June.
Key Issues and Options
An immediate issue for the Council is the renewal of MINURSO’s mandate. Council members expect to receive the full strategic review requested by resolution 2797. It remains unclear whether the strategic review will be finalised ahead of the mandate renewal and how it will be taken forward.
One option would therefore be for the Council to renew MINURSO’s existing mandate for another year without making any changes, allowing additional time for the political process to make progress before reconsidering the mission’s tasks and configuration.
Alternatively, the Council could opt for a shorter renewal, such as six months, creating an earlier opportunity to assess whether the negotiations have advanced sufficiently to inform the strategic review and possible adjustments to the mission’s mandate.
Nevertheless, the underlying issue remains how to facilitate a viable and lasting resolution to the long-standing dispute over the status of Western Sahara. Council members continue to navigate the competing interests and positions of key stakeholders, which shape deliberations on this file.
Against this backdrop, MINURSO’s ability to implement its mandate remains constrained, while the operational environment remains tense. Hostilities have persisted at a low to medium intensity, falling short of large-scale confrontation, but the absence of progress in the political process continues to generate instability and the risk of further escalation.
One option for Council members could be to adopt a press statement following the October consultations. The statement could express support for the diplomatic efforts led by de Mistura and the US, urge the relevant parties to resume negotiations, and encourage them to engage constructively and demonstrate flexibility with a view to overcoming the current impasse and making progress towards a political solution.
Council Dynamics
Council members continue to differ significantly in their national positions on Western Sahara. The US, the penholder on Western Sahara, recognised Moroccan sovereignty over the territory in December 2020 during President Donald Trump’s first administration and has maintained this position. The current administration has reiterated that it considers Morocco’s autonomy proposal the only basis for a just and lasting solution.
France supports the Moroccan autonomy plan as the “only basis” for achieving a political solution, while the UK describes the autonomy proposal as the “most credible, viable and pragmatic basis for a lasting resolution of the dispute”. Countries such as France and the US have also sought to make significant investments in projects in Western Sahara. Denmark views Morocco’s autonomy plan as “a good basis for an agreed solution between all parties”, while Greece considers it a “serious and credible” approach.
Among the other elected members, Bahrain, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Liberia support Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and have opened consulates in the territory.
In a 6 December 2025 statement, Somalia called on the parties to engage in serious and direct negotiations aimed at reaching a mutually acceptable solution, while reaffirming its commitment to strengthening cooperation with Morocco and to mutual respect for each country’s national unity and sovereignty.
Latvia maintains cordial relations with both Algeria and Morocco but does not recognise the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) or endorse Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. Meanwhile, Colombia shifted its position following the election of President Abelardo de la Espriella, recognising Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara in August.
In November 2024, Panama suspended diplomatic relations with the SADR and subsequently described Morocco’s autonomy proposal as “the most serious, credible, and realistic basis” for a lasting solution.
Pakistan, by contrast, has emphasised the importance of self-determination and abstained on resolution 2797.
Source : Security Council report
#Western Sahara #Morocco #Polisario #UNSC
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