In an article titled "The Last Quarter of an Hour"—an awkward expression that in Algeria evokes a speech by the French colonial army—Noureddine Boukrouh published on his personal website, he argues that "the choice left to the Polisario is no longer between autonomous status and independence, but between autonomy and the status of a terrorist, between the Moroccan plan and nothing at all, for having failed to think of a Plan B."
Tags : Western Sahara, Polisario Front, Algeria, United States, UN Security Council, Resolution 2797 (2025), Morocco, autonomy,
The latest UN Security Council resolution on Western Sahara, adopted on October 31, 2025, was met in Algeria with a combination of tepid official criticism, media denial, and, above all, concerns about emerging American pressure.
Lakhdar Benchiba*
UN Security Council Resolution 2797 (2025), adopted on October 31, 2025, marks a significant shift in the Western Sahara file. The United States, the authors of an initial draft that was openly pro-Moroccan and advocated for autonomy as the only solution, agreed to water it down to secure the passage of the essential elements. The final resolution thus reaffirms the principle of self-determination as the legal basis for the UN process, while explicitly highlighting the Moroccan autonomy plan as something that « could represent the most feasible solution. »
This political shift does not change the territory’s status, which is still considered non-self-governing by the UN, but it steers diplomatic action towards a negotiated solution based on autonomy. While the resolution mentions a « mutually acceptable » agreement, it no longer refers to a referendum as a means of expressing self-determination—a key demand of the Sahrawis that had been consistently reaffirmed in previous UN resolutions.
Explaining the « Empty Chair »
While Algerian media has downplayed the resolution or engaged in denial, Algeria’s foreign minister, Ahmed Attaf, highlighted Algeria’s efforts to reword the resolution prepared by the United States, which had already recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara in exchange for normalization with Israel.
The official Algerian discourse avoids any direct criticism of Washington, while attempting to reassure a public opinion attached to the principle of self-determination. The foreign minister stated on the Algerian channel AL24 News that Algeria « came within a hair’s breadth of voting for » the Security Council resolution. However, the retention in the preamble of the assertion that « genuine autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty could constitute one of the most realistic solutions » prompted Algiers to abstain from the vote, citing its « distancing from a text that does not faithfully and sufficiently reflect the UN doctrine on decolonization. »
This explanation for the « empty chair » has been met with skepticism in Algeria. Some analysts see it primarily as a concern to avoid « ruffling feathers » in the United States and to defend an Algerian diplomacy that is living off the distant capital of the war of independence. The slow erosion of international support for a referendum on self-determination for Western Sahara, including in Africa where it was once very high, is an illustration of this.
In a country where the media takes its orders, it is on social networks that questions are emerging about the possible failure of a half-century of political, diplomatic, and financial investment in the Western Sahara issue, which over the years has become the central axis of the country’s foreign policy.
While the Security Council resolution does not grant Western Sahara to Morocco, the direction imparted to the issue by the United States (the resolution was approved by 11 votes, with three abstentions—Russia, China, and Pakistan—and Algeria’s absence) is likely to strengthen in the coming months.
Realists vs. Orthodox
The Security Council vote has brought back to the surface in Algeria a minority current—which has always existed within the regime—calling for getting rid of the Western Sahara issue and the burdens it imposes on the country.
In March 2003, former Defense Minister General Khaled Nezzar (1937-2023), whose influence remained great within the power structure, made headlines by stating to La Gazette du Maroc that « Algeria does not need a new state at its borders… » He deferred the decision to break the deadlock to President Abdelaziz Bouteflika: « If the President of the Republic cannot, or rather will not, move towards a breakthrough, the army will not be able to confront it; it is at the disposal of the political leadership. »
This was a reminder of orthodoxy that proved effective. Khaled Nezzar, likely reined in by his peers, never spoke on the subject again, but the debate has resurfaced following the latest Security Council resolution. This « realist » current has spoken again through Noureddine Boukrouh, a twice minister under President Abdelaziz Bouteflika now living abroad, who believes the game is up.
In an article titled « The Last Quarter of an Hour »—an awkward expression that in Algeria evokes a speech by the French colonial army—published on his personal website, he argues that « the choice left to the Polisario is no longer between autonomous status and independence, but between autonomy and the status of a terrorist, between the Moroccan plan and nothing at all, for having failed to think of a Plan B. »
For Boukrouh, the Polisario Front must now be realistic and give up on a « speculative Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic [SADR] » and accept a « real and viable Autonomous Region of the Sahara (RAS). »
He drew a sharp response from columnist Abed Charef in an article entitled « Noureddine Boukrouh, collateral victim of the Trump effect in Western Sahara, » published on October 28, 2025, in Al-hirak al-ikhbari. For Abed Charef, the Security Council vote does not change the situation, stating that it is not through this approach that the US will remodel the region’s map as they please, because there is a people who aspire to exercise their right to self-determination, supported by other freedom-loving peoples—a position in line with Algerian orthodoxy.
The Proposal of Mediation
However, in his press conference on November 18, Ahmed Attaf confirmed that Algiers is no longer in its usual comfort zone of defending the principle of self-determination through a referendum, as evidenced by its readiness to support mediation between Morocco and the Polisario Front.
« Given the facts and the responsibilities incumbent upon it as a country neighboring both parties to the conflict, Algeria will not hesitate to lend its support to any mediation initiative between the Polisario Front and Morocco. »
This support comes with « conditions. » The mediation must fall within the framework of the United Nations and must adhere, in form and content, to the principles of a just, lasting, and definitive solution to the question of Western Sahara, as stipulated in all relevant Security Council resolutions, including the latest Resolution 2797.
Despite the reiteration of these « conditions, » this evolution where Algeria would play a « facilitator » role is perplexing. Firstly, Algeria broke off diplomatic relations with Morocco in August 2021, accusing Morocco of hostile actions, which does not make it the most suited to play facilitator. More fundamentally, if such mediation were to be established, could its « subject » be anything other than the autonomy plan highlighted in the resolution, which the United States wants to pass off as an effective exercise of Sahrawi self-determination?
Under Washington’s Close Watch
The question of relations with the United States is crucial. Algeria faces major geostrategic difficulties. It has challenging situations on all its borders—Libya, Mali, Niger, Morocco. Its « friendship » with Russia is troubled by diverging interests in the Sahel. And China trades with everyone, and even more so with Morocco. The largest country in Africa is therefore the subject of particular attention from the United States.
The US Ambassador to Algiers, Elizabeth Moore Aubin, who has been in post since 2022, has been demonstrating unusual activism. Since her arrival, she has multiplied her travels within Algeria, including outside Algiers, meeting with entrepreneurs, NGOs, start-ups, local elected officials, and students—a public presence rarely observed from a Western diplomat in the country. Even during the most intense bombings on Gaza, she did not reduce her media exposure, a sign of a confident and determined US diplomacy.
This US interventionism in the Western Sahara file also comes in a context of the return of US oil companies to Algeria. In August 2025, Occidental Petroleum signed two agreements with the National Agency for the Valorization of Hydrocarbon Resources (Alnaft) to explore the perimeters of El Ouabed and Dahar in southern Algeria. ExxonMobil and Chevron are close to finalizing an agreement for shale gas exploitation. An article in Maghreb Emergent noted that « the entry of American players into unconventional gas fields in Algeria » could, if not save the UN self-determination plan, be a lever to mitigate American pressure.
However, the brutal way the US operates creates uncertainty. Will Algerian concessions in this area be a sufficient « transaction » to ease pressure from a Trump administration eager to add the Western Sahara issue to its trophy case of « peacemaking »?
A Troubling Vote on Gaza
The real question—and, for some, the real apprehension—concerns how the United States will use this resolution, which gives a diplomatic boost to the autonomy plan. In Algiers, the statement on CBS by Steve Witkoff, an advisor to Donald Trump on the Middle East, that a « peace agreement » would be concluded between Algeria and Morocco « within 60 days » did not go unnoticed. It was widely perceived as the beginning of the anticipated pressures. Attaf was quick to extract Algeria from the one-on-one with Morocco projected by the American advisor, suggesting there was confusion between the Western Sahara file and Algerian-Moroccan relations.
Christopher Ross, the former UN Personal Envoy for Western Sahara (2009–2017), while calling the Security Council resolution a « setback, » understood it differently: « Steve Witkoff’s prediction… is, I fear, wishful thinking. » He added that Algeria « is not known for yielding to pressure nor for practicing transactional diplomacy. »
Anna Theofilopoulou, a former advisor to James Baker, himself a former UN Personal Envoy for Western Sahara (1997-2004), is less categorical. In a statement to the Spanish media El Independiente on November 9, 2025, she questioned Algeria’s role: « Before, I would have said the Algerians would have devoured him for breakfast. Today, I’m less sure… »
Since the Security Council resolution is not a de jure recognition of the « Moroccanness » of Western Sahara, what happens next will depend on US action—or lack thereof—towards Algeria and the Polisario Front, and on the latter’s ability to resist pressure from the Trump administration.
The troubling vote by Algeria on the US resolution on Gaza on November 17—while Russia and China abstained—raises doubts about this capacity. In Algiers, some interpret this vote—unusually conciliatory towards Washington—as a sign of a new configuration in the balance of power. Faced with criticism and denunciations on social networks—despite the risks in a country where a Facebook post can lead to prison—the official reaction has been very threatening.
The Algerian official press agency APS recalled on November 18 that the Constitution « makes foreign policy the exclusive domain of the President of the Republic, as the sole and unique architect of foreign policy decision, in the name of the Algerian Nation. » It denounced « internal parties » engaged in a « heinous attempt to instrumentalize the country’s foreign policy for the sake of narrow political calculations. » The commentary stated that the national state « will never allow its sovereign decision in matters of foreign policy to be transformed into a tool for political or partisan bargaining, narrow in their scope as in their vision. » The message is clear: fall in line.
Lakhdar Benchiba
Journalist (Algiers)
Source: Orient XXI, November 25, 2025
#WesternSahara #Polisario #Morocco #Algeria #UnitedStates #autonomy
