Arms sales to Morocco notwithstanding, the United States, regardless of the political party in power, has followed an official policy of neutrality on the Western Sahara issue, recognizing neither the Polisario-declared Sahara Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) nor Moroccan sovereignty over what Rabat views as its “southern provinces.”
Tags : #WesternSahara #FrentePolisario #Morocco #UnitedStates #USA #NorthAfrica #Maghreb #Sahel #Security #Terrorism
In U.S. official circles, the Western Sahara issue is seen now not just as a conflict over territory or for national self-determination, but as a major impediment to regional cooperation in trade and, more impor-tantly, to countering terrorism. In the beginning, however, it sparked congressional debate over King Hassan II‟s use of U.S. arms in the region and restrictions on the supply of some weapons.
In the Spanish (later Western) Sahara, the colonial region to Morocco‟s south, beleaguered Hassan II found a means to stabilize his regime with a new, powerful national objective around which to rally his people. In November 1975, the King launched a Green March of unarmed civilians who crossed a few kilometers into the Western Sahara. Spain soon relinquished control of the territory to Morocco and Mauritania, which rapidly sent their troops to claim the territory in December. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Saqiat al Hamra and Rio de Oro or Polisario, a national liberation movement seeking the Western Sahara‟s self-determination, had other ideas. In January 1976, the first armed battles occurred between Morocco and the Polisario and, in February, the Polisario declared the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).
Due to the Polisario’s resistance, the King needed increased military assistance to assert Moroccan sovereignty over the territory. Such aid had been a major element in his bilateral relationship with the United States. In the 1970‟s, however, congressional restrictions on U.S. arms supplies required Morocco (and other countries) to use them only for internal security and legitimate self defence. The conditions would be violated if Morocco used the weapons beyond its inter-nationally recognized borders, i.e., in the Western Sahara. Morocco violated the U.S. restrictions on use of arms in the Western Sahara, prompting Washington to reject a Moroccan request for fixed-wing counterinsurgency aircraft and attack helicopters in 1977.
Other U.S. arms classified as defensive continued to be supplied on a grant basis, including air defense weapons and communications equipment. Then, after the Polisario launched attacks within Morocco, President Jimmy Carter approved a major $235 million sale of armed reconnaissance aircraft, jet fighters, and helicopters. Polisario military successes also prompted the United States to provide Morocco with tanks and to refit U.S.-supplied fighters with electronic equipment for countermeasures.
In the early 1980s, U.S. electronic equipment affixed to the defensive barrier (berm) that Morocco constructed in the Western Sahara enabled it to successfully counter Polisario guerrillas and prevent their incursion into both the Western Sahara and Morocco. The berm helped Morocco secure control over more than 80% of the territory of the Western Sahara, which continues to this day.
Some analysts suggest that it was not just the Polisario successes that led the United States to increase arms sales. The United States also appreciated King Hassan II’s willingness to supply troops to back Western interests in Zaire in 1977 and 1978; was grateful to him for briefly offering asylum to the Shah of Iran, an American ally; and Saudi Arabia, an influential U.S. partner and oil supplier that also was a key Moroccan benefactor, supported the sale.21 Saudi Arabia provided financial assistance to Morocco that compensated for its inability for pay for U.S. arms as these were sales not grants. It would do so again in later years, notably for Morocco’s first purchase of U.S. F-16 fighter planes in 1994.
Arms sales to Morocco notwithstanding, the United States, regardless of the political party in power, has followed an official policy of neutrality on the Western Sahara issue, recognizing neither the Polisario-declared Sahara Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) nor Moroccan sovereignty over what Rabat views as its “southern provinces.” Administrations have encouraged U.N. efforts to resolve the dispute, including the appointment of two senior American diplo-mats, former Secretary of State James A. Baker, III (1997 to 2004) and Ambassador Christopher Ross (2009 to present), as the Secre-tary General‟s Personal Envoy for the Western Sahara. However, the parties‟ lack of will to compromise supported by their patrons has stymied all envoys regardless of nationality.
The United States, less openly, also has not wanted a settle-ment that might destabilize the kingdom, which, as noted above, has defined the Western Sahara as its “national issue.” Critics maintain that the United States is not neutral, but supports the Moroccan stance. They note that the U.S. State Department, like France, rapidly praised King Mohammed VI‟s 2007 autonomy plan, which is based on the premise that the Western Sahara is and will remain Moroccan.23 Soon after it ws proposed, then Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns described the plan as “a serious and credible proposal to provide real autonomy for the Western Sahara.”24 On several occasions, current U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton has echoed that phrase.
The U.S. legislature has more varied views. Every Congress has some Members who want the United States to put a higher priority on the Sahraouis‟ right to self-determination, which they con-tend is more in line with core U.S. values. They continue to favor the U.N. referendum process that offers the right as an option, but that appears to have reached a dead-end.27 The Polisario, which is active on Capitol Hill, has successfully courted some Congressional Black Caucus members, who view the Western Sahara as the last colony in Africa, and some Hispanic Members with whom it shares Spanish language ties.
Other Hispanics, notably Cuban-American representatives, support Morocco because of the Polisario‟s ties to the Castro regime, which has provided it with military training and educational scholarships and recognized the SADR. During visits to Morocco, U.S. legislative delegations find that counterparts emphasize the Polisario-Cuban connection as they try to win over their interlocutors. More recently, Moroccan officials also have attempted to cultivate Americans with claims that Polisario-administered areas are vulne-rable to terrorist infiltration or that the Polisario sent mercenaries to support Libyan leader Muammar al Qaddafi against the rebels during the current conflict.
Even before Congress’s current preoccupation with the nation-nal debt and budget deficits, some Members and other prominent Americans questioned U.S. contributions to funding the United Nations Mission for the Organization of a Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO) with arguments that seem unrelated to the merits of the Western Sahara issue. They maintain it is a costly operation that has an unachievable mandate and only served to help perpetuate the status quo or stalemate. They advocate shifting to voluntary funding in order support higher priority U.N. needs. U.S. official defenders of MINURSO advance the traditional line that it is indispen-sable because it has kept the cease-fire for two decades and that the United States has no interest in a resumed armed conflict.
18 For background, see John Damis, Conflict in Northwest Africa: the Western Sahara Dispute, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1983. For a recent critical overview, see Jacob Mundy and Stephen Zunes, Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2010.
19 Stephen J. Solarz, “Arms for Morocco?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 2, Winter 1979. Former Congressman Solarz wrote about the arms debate while still in office and as it was happening.
20 Morris Draper, “Arms Sales to Morocco: Western Sahara Conflict,” Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 81, No. 2051, June 1981.
21 U.S. Department of the Army, Morocco: A Country Study, edited by Harold D. Nelson, 1985.
22 For an examination of the problems with the settlement process, see Anna Theofilopoulou, “The Failure of „Negotiations Without Preconditions,‟” United States Institute of Peace, Peace Brief 22, April 23, 2010,
23 For two views of autonomy plan, see William I. Zartman, “Time for a Solution in the Western Sahara Conflict,” and Yahia H. Zoubir, “Stalemate in Western Sahara: Ending International Illegality, both in Middle East Policy, December 1, 2007.
24 “„Serious and Credible,‟ in Washington‟s Own Words,”
http://www.autonomyplan.org – which appears to be an official Moroccan government website – and U.S. Department of State, response to taken question, May 2, 2008.
25 Remarks with Moroccan Foreign Minister Taeib Fassi Fihri, March 23, 2011, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/03/158895.htm.
26 Impressions of Congress are based the author’s more than 20 years of working for the Congressional Research Service, a legislative support agency.
27 For more background on the stalemate, see Erik Jensen (a former MINURSO official), Anatomy of a Stalemate, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series, December 1, 2004.
28 Brett Schaefer, “Urgent Problems that Need Congressional Action,” Heritage Foundation Lecture #1177, February 3, 2011, www.heritage.org.
29 See statements of U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations in various U.N. Security Council debates on extending the MINURSO mandate.
Source : U.S.-Moroccan Relations, How Special? Carol Migdalovitz, October 2011
