Tags : Morocco, King Hassan II, Coup d’Etat of Boeing, United States, declassified files,
This document is a diplomatic cable containing a preliminary assessment of the failed assassination attempt on King Hassan II of Morocco on August 16, 1972, by rebel air force pilots, followed by a detailed account of an audience with the King on September 7.
Key Points from the Audience:
King’s Belief in External Manipulation: King Hassan is convinced that the lead plotters, Generals Medbouh and Oufkir, were « manipulated » by an outside force, though he admits he has no evidence of « what name or what flag » is responsible. He argues they lacked the popular base or intellectual resources within the royal family to rule alone and must have counted on foreign backing.
Political Intentions: The King frames the attempts as attacks on liberty and civilization, not just the monarchy. He expresses a determined goal to establish a democracy under a constitutional monarchy, using upcoming elections and a new parliament to share power, potentially even appointing opposition members as Prime Minister.
Army Purge: He is resolved to thoroughly « cleanse » the military of those involved in the attempt, punishing them « to the limit » to reassert control.
Image and Reality: His advisor, Ahmed Osman, who was present, privately suggests the King would prefer to be a constitutional monarch but feels the political structure does not yet exist. He reveals past failed negotiations with the opposition and cautions that public statements by political leaders are often unreliable.
Ambassador’s Analysis (Comment): The U.S. Ambassador is skeptical. He believes the King does not genuinely think a foreign power was involved but finds it « useful » to promote this theory to distract from the real, internal causes of the plots—namely, the regime’s and the King’s own failings. The King’s refusal to admit any personal responsibility was apparent.
Future Outlook: The Ambassador assesses that the King’s strategy is to lure parties into elections, possibly grant parliament more authority, and ruthlessly purge the army simultaneously. However, he doubts the King has any intention of abdicating and expects any future parliament will struggle to prevent royal encroachment on its powers.
U.S. Concerns: While the King was cordial and made no direct accusations, the Ambassador notes the « foreign manipulator » theory could easily be applied to the U.S., given its military training role in Morocco. He reiterates that rumors of U.S. complicity persist among the King’s entourage but believes the King himself does not credit them, using the theory tactically.
Text of the cable
Attempted assassination of king hassan: preliminary assessment
ref : rabat 3746.
-We have seen this afternoon and evening what now appears to be the failurf of one more desperate attempt to eliminate king hassan from leadership of morocco. king has had what can only be described as miraculous escape. it is hard to understand how trained fighter pilot, flying as escort, could have failed to shoot down king’s plane, although one of our muslo staff has noted that f-5 fighter pilots have not mad much opportunity to practice with live ammunition since attempted coup at skhirat last year.
-It now evident that assassination attempt carried out by small elite group of fighter pilots with support at least some air force enlisted men. lack of evidence thus far of any collusion with any other military or civilian elements suggests f-5 squadrons only self-assigned mission was to remove king. presumably they gambled that the effective removal of king would be accepted by rest of military, including oufkir, and country at large. (it appears that oufkir’s close friend amekrane, who has reportedly landed in gibraltar, was in qn plot: rabat 3760)
-Gamble was lost, and it impossible to tell how king will react to assassination attempt. one thing certain. fact that us navy has presence at kenitra and the us air forcf trained moroccan f-5 fighter squadron is lost on no one and could likely have effect on us military presence here. i have already emphasized to foreign minister benhima that there is absolutely no us involvement – even unwitting – in what was obviously all moroccan affair. on instructions from the department i am seeking see benhima again tonight to formally convey our shock and dismay at any suggestion that americans could in any way be involved in an activity threatening the security of the kjng and to ask government of morocco to act promptly to prevfnt further circulation of such rumors.
gds de tarr
ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF KING HASSAN: PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT
REF : RABAT 3746.
GDS DE TARR
Subject : Audience with King Hassan
Summary : King Hassan convinced that Medbouh and Oufkir were manipulated but says he does not know by whom ; Is determined to clean the military establishment ; desires establish democratic rule by majority under legitimacy of monarchy ; counts on elections and new parliament to promote this ; looked managing affairs of state. End summary.
On september 7 I was received in audience by King Hassan at the Skhirat Palace. As instructed, I reiterated to king our pleasure and relief that he had successfully overcome shameful attempt aagainst his life,and our deep and sympathetic concern with problems he now facing : I added that I had also been instructed to seek his personnal assessment of current situation, with particular reference to army and political parties.
After thanking me warmly for these sentiments, king began by saying that he was convinced that both generals Medbouh and Oufkir had been « manipulated ». He was frank to say, however, that he had no evidence which would tell him « what name or what flag » to attache to the manipulators. When I asked king why he ws certain some outside element ws behind the two unsuccessful attempts on his life, he replied that it « hat to be so » neither Medbouh nor Oufkir could have managed to run the country by themselves, lacking as they did any popular base whatsoever : They must have counted on someone who would be willing for his own profit to provide the assistance which the Medbouh-Oufkir cliques would have required in order to meet Morocco’s needs and thus maintain themselves in power. In order to avoid chaos, and because of the moroccan people’s concern for legitimacy, either General would also have had to find a member of the Alaouite dynasty to use as a puppet. « I have lots of cousins, of course, but intellectually what are they ? », The Generals would have had little help from such a quarter, the king said. They must have counted on a outside element.
The king hoped that the « living forces » of the nation would come to understand that both attempts werw not directed against the monarchy per se or « against him personally » but rather against liberty and civilization in Morocco. Had the Medbouh or Oufkir groups been successful, they would have seen to it that the political parties were put out of action permanently and rule by military junta firmly established. « No one would have been safe ».
TheKing said that he was determined to establish democracy by majority rule under the legitimacy of the monarchy. He looked to the forthcoming elections and the resultant parliament to promote this. He could not subscribe to th thesis held by Oufkir that underdevelopped countries cannot have democracy ; even if the opposition politicl parties should find themselves in a minority position in the parliament as a result of the elections this would not prelude their representatives from being appointed to the government and possibly even to the position of Prime Minister. The King was encouraged by the heavy registration for the elections which had taken place. The parties, he said, had ordered their members to register.
With regrd to the army, the King said that it had to be cleansed ». He was determined that those guilty of the event of august 16 sould be punished « to the limit ». The army had to be brought under control. I remarked that we had received the impression that there was much resentment among military officers, and a negative attitude toward him personally, as a result of his sharp words to the military 16 and because the ammunition had been taken away from military units. The King said that military units should have their ammunition with them ; in most countries in peacetime ammunition was kept apart from the units in special storage places.
The King concluded by saying that he was a « free man », loyal but not subservient to his friends. Some people might not like this, but he was determined to pursue this course.
Ahmed Osman, who was the only other person present during the audience, dropped by the house afterwards to continue the discussion. When I told him that we had absolutely no indication of any foreing manipulation of either Medbouh or Oufkir, and that I really did wonder why the king seemed so certain that there was someone behind the generals, Osman merely said that the King had deduced this by the logic of the situation as he had expressed it to me.
Osman went on to say that there was nothing the king would like better than to be a constitutional monarch like Queen Elizabeth. « Do you tjin he enjoys being shot at ? ». If he felt there were a political structure capable of running the country, he would retire to a constitutional position at once. He might even, in such cirmstances, step down from the throne and reside in Morocco as a private citizen, « as all his property is here ». However, such a political structure does not exist ans mus be created.
Osman said that in his characterstic frankness with his american friends, the King had told assistant secretary newsom during his visit here last year that he expected within ours or days to announce the formation of a coalition government with opposition representatives. The King said this because he really believed that the opposition had accepted his offer of « ten ministries, including the prime ministry, and even an undersecretaryship in the ministry of the interior ». However, when he received national front delegates within minutes after newsom’s departure, they told him to his stupefaction that instead of accepting what he had offered, they wanted « everything except defense ans PTT ». This the king could not agree to, since the national front had not gained the right through elections to represent the whole country, thus the negotiations had failed. The King’s readiness to grant so many posts to the opposition showed his sincere desire to share power. It ha been revealing that representatives of the national front had frankly confessed to the king taht they could not agree among themselves as to who among them should be the prime minister. Osman cautioned that what the political leaders say publicly often does not reflect what they really think.
Osman hoped that Morocco would be spared another of the traumatic experiences it had recently had and be given the time to work for the establishment by the King of majority-rule democracy the King so earnestly desired. It, and the king, did not deserve what had happened. I commented that the king had a serious problem of image. Osman agreed.
Osman said that the people fvored the curbing of the military. It was feared because of the excesses it had committed against civilians. The government has received reports of resentment among military officers similat to those I had mentioned to the king.
The King, Osman said, is an intellectual. He would welcome someone of his stature coming into authority so that problems could be meaningfully debated.
Osman concluded by saying that they counted on continuing US sympathy and help.
Comment : The King looked as well as I have ever seen him and seemed fully in command of himself. He was eloquent and self-assured as he discussed the situation in response to my questions.
I do not believe that he really thinks that there was a foreing hand in the two plots. He finds it useful to advance this theis, which so exaggerates the importance of Morocco, to distract people from the real causes of the two attempts. His stubborn refusal to admit that any failing on his part could have been responsible for what has happened was apparent in the conversation.
As to how he intends to proceed over the coming weeks to assure the continuation of royal rule in Morocco, it would appear that he intends to try to lure the political parties into participating in the elections and that he may well be prepared to see the resultant parliament exercise a wider degree of authority. Meanwhile, he will purge the army in order to try to remove any further danger from the quarter. I do not rhink that he has any intention of abdicating, and I should imagine that ifa parliament with broader powers should be established, it will have some difficulty in preventing royal encroachment upon its prerogatives.
I now am glad the department instructed me to see the king. I had been reluctant to seek an audience for fear that under the lingering effects of August 16 he might say soñething unpalatable about our military presence. However, he was exceedingly cordial and made no reference whatsoever to our military or to any embarrassment arising from the american angle to the August 16 events. Nontheless, the theis he set forth with regard to the « name or flag » which was behind the plotters could obviously be applied to the United States if one wished to do so. We believe there are those in his entourage who are allegins US complicity in the August 16 attack. I reiterate my believe, however, that the King does not really think we were involved, he is using the foreing factor theory to distract attention from the regime’s and his personal failings and to keep people, including ourselves, off balance.
Source : The Office of the historian, August 17, 1972
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