Tags : Western Sahara Polisario Front Morocco Resolution 2797 (2025) Security Council France United States
In an article published by the International Centre for Democratic Initiatives, Christopher Ross—former personal envoy of the UN Secretary-General—sounds the alarm: the new Security Council resolution is not a step forward, but a historical setback. For the first time, the UN text implicitly grants legitimacy to the Moroccan autonomy plan, relegating the sacred principle of self-determination to the status of a mere procedural formality.
Here isi the full post:
A Step Back for Western Sahara
The resolution that the United Nations Security Council adopted on October 31 on the 50-year-old Western Sahara conflict is a step backward despite the claims of its supporters.
In every resolution since 2007, the Council has called on the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy to “assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.” However, other than calling for negotiations in good faith and without preconditions, it has not provided substantive specifics. These have been left for the parties to negotiate under the auspices of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy.
Ambiguity about Moroccan sovereignty and Saharawi self determination
This time, the United States as penholder, or leader of the negotiations, on Western Sahara decided to try using this latest resolution to force movement in line with President Donald Trump’s December 2020 recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Territory. Thus, in its first draft it called on the parties to negotiate since Morocco’s April 2007 proposal for autonomy within Moroccan sovereignty, which it called “the most feasible solution.” It did not, however, go as far as to say that Morocco has sovereignty over the Territory and, like all prior resolutions, which it specifically reaffirmed in the preambular language, it maintained the requirement of self-determination. That said, it never once mentioned the Polisario Front’s contemporaneous proposal for a referendum that included independence as an option and close relations with Morocco in the event that option was chosen.
This draft triggered extensive wrangling among the members of the Council. Russia objected to the US penholder’s attempt to use the text to support its national position on the conflict and several members criticized its highly unbalanced nature. Many objected to shortening the extension of MINURSO’s mandate from one year to six months. They rejected the penholders’ argument that this would put pressure on the parties to settle, and they wanted to preserve MINURSO’s ability to monitor the ceasefire as well as developments on the ground on behalf of the Council. Algeria inside the Council and the Polisario outside condemned the draft’s omission of any mention of the Polisario’s proposal.
In the course of the wrangling, the penholder made several revisions, the most important being those of referring to the Moroccan proposal merely as “a most feasible solution” to the conflict rather than “the most feasible” and extending MINURSO’ mandate by one year. These and other small changes were enough to prevent any veto of the resolution, and it was adopted despite its unbalanced nature with the U.S., France, the United Kingdom, and eight non-permanent members voting in favor, Russia, China, and Pakistan abstaining, and Algeria not voting. The Russian Permanent Representative, in explaining his country’s abstention, remarked dryly that he hoped the U.S. “cowboy charge” in pushing Morocco’s autonomy proposal would not lead to heightened tensions in the region.
An unprecedented opportunity for lasting peace in Western Sahara?
Where then does this resolution take us? It welcomes “the initiative of the Personal Envoy to convene the parties to build on momentum and seize this unprecedented opportunity for a lasting peace” (sic) and expresses “appreciation to the United States for its readiness to host negotiations.” It will be instructive to see how the Polisario and Algeria react to a call for renewed face-to-face meetings in these circumstances. They are likely to attend, especially if Morocco eases up on trying to make Algeria its sole interlocutor on this dossier and the US hosts the talks. That said, the respective roles of the Personal Envoy and the US in any meetings that the latter hosts remain to be clarified. However they are conducted, the positions of the parties will remain inflexible.
What can individual members of the Council and others, notably Spain, do to help the Personal Envoy break this stalemate? And what can he do to organize genuine negotiations without preconditions when Morocco seeks to limit discussions to its autonomy proposal as a precondition, now with the Council’s blessing? The simple answer in both cases is not much. Absent heavy pressure on the parties from outside (or a move to Chapter VII that I half-jokingly raised once only to have the members of the Council explode), the stasis that has plagued this dossier will continue indefinitely. Both parties are unyielding and both have ready supporters.
Selective pressure in favor of Morocco, as this resolution attempts, will not help. It will make the parties only dig in further. Morocco will seek even more support worldwide and the Polisario and Algeria will stiffen their opposition. In such a situation, where mutual respect and trust are absent, none of the parties is motivated to work for a solution. If the US ends up hosting meetings and tries to mediate a compromise “deal” to add to its list of conflicts resolved, its efforts will fall on deaf ears.
Both parties (or all three, if Algeria is counted, as Morocco wants) believe that their respective readings of the historical, documentary, and diplomatic record serve their interests and support their positions.
Morocco continues to defend its “national cause” among its population, builds facts on the ground, exploits the resources of the Territory, encourages the arrival of settlers, and shows no interest in genuine negotiations without preconditions, although it is prepared to participate in pro forma meetings that, as in the past, never lead to real negotiations.
The Polisario takes pride in the recognition of courts from the International Court of Justice to the European Union that Western Sahara is an entity separate from Morocco and in the conviction that it could engage in self-government and prosper thanks to its phosphates, fisheries, precious metals, and tourism. Absent pressure from Algeria, the Polisario and its supporters among the people of Western Sahara who yearn for a say in their future have no incentive to accept Morocco’s proposal. As a refugee student once told me: “As hard as life is here in a desert camp, it is better than kissing the King’s hand.”
Algeria has its own reasons for adamantly supporting the Polisario’s quest for a referendum and independence. This accords with its own path to independence through years of struggle against France and its support for national liberation and self-determination as universal principles. More concretely, support for an independent Western Sahara helps to counter rhetoric within the Moroccan political class claiming Eastern Sahara, i.e., those parts of the Sahara that were historically part of the Sultan’s domains but were transferred to Algeria by its French rulers in 1934. Algeria may also seek to keep Morocco off guard in their competition for regional and continental superiority. As the late President Boumediene is reputed to have once said: “I will make the Sahara a pebble in Morocco’s shoe.” The open presence of Israel in support of Morocco over the past few years merely adds to Algeria’s resolve.
The Council can be of little use in this situation. It is too divided to do much more than express support for the Personal Envoy’s efforts. Certain members of the Council may believe that the Polisario and Algeria can be pushed to accept the Moroccan proposal and that this latest resolution is a first step. Unless some deal has been or will be cut with Algeria, this is very unlikely. Algeria is not known for responding to pressure or engaging in transactional diplomacy.
Some suggestions on the way forward for one of the longest running conflicts
I cannot presume to recommend courses of action to the Personal Envoy, since it has been nine years since I left the dossier and he knows better than I what is possible today and what is not. More generally, however, I do offer three thoughts:
First, those who in today’s world are called “influencers” should work to involve younger generations among the three populations — those of Western Sahara, Morocco, and Algeria — in building bridges to greater long-term mutual understanding and respect through various exchanges that promote the kind of fluid communications that existed between Moroccans and Algerians in the days of King Hassan and then died out. Steve Witkoff’s prediction that Algeria and Morocco will normalize their relationship within sixty days is, I fear, a fantasy. This goal must be approached with sensitivity and patience.
Second, the parties should be encouraged to think even at this early stage about how the two halves of the population of Western Sahara in the camps and in the Territory can participate in determining their future. Without their active involvement, no settlement can be stable, lasting, and just. Too often, analysts especially in Morocco and in the U.S. assert that it is up to Algeria and Morocco alone to find a solution over the heads of the people of Western Sahara. This should not and cannot happen.
Third, even at this early stage, thought should be given to what kinds of international guarantees could be implemented for any settlement that may be reached. In the absence of mutual trust, these would be crucial in nudging the parties toward a solution and ensuring that it is stable and lasting.
In sum, both the Western Sahara conflict and the poor relations between Morocco and Algeria require active management to prevent tensions from escalating into serious threats to peace and stability. Little more can be done in the short term. Here, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINISURO) has a useful role to play. At present, the Council, having embraced the Moroccan proposal, does not.
Christopher Ross spent over 20 years as an American diplomat working in or on North Africa, serving successively in Tripoli, Fez, and Algiers for the United States State Department. He was Personal Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for Western Sahara between 2009-2017.
Source : ICDI
#WesternSahara #Morocco
