Tags : Israel, Palestine, Gaza, Hamas, EtatsUnis, Morocco, Russie, Chine, Syrie, Liban, Irak, Iran, Hezbollah,
As Israeli troops enter Gaza, Henry Laurens provides, for Famille Chrétienne, an overview of the geopolitical repercussions of events in the Middle East.
Professor Henry Laurens holds the chair of Contemporary History of the Arab World at the Collège de France. His latest published works are: Civilizations. The interviews of the Treilles foundation, Proceedings of the conference, Collège de France, September 24-27, 2018, Gallimard, 2022; and The Imposed Past, Fayard, 2022.
Do the October 7 attack and its reprisals change the situation in the Middle East?
Yes, this is reshuffling the cards, because the Palestinian issue, which was considered practically impossible to resolve, had been put aside. We gave a little economic aid to the Palestinian Authority, we let Qatar give a little money to Hamas: we had security, and we moved on to more important things, like the Abraham Accords. It all completely collapsed. On the one hand, because the attack brought the Palestinian issue back to the forefront. On the other hand, because its geopolitical consequences concern the Middle East, but also all Western powers.
Since the summer of 2020, Israel had normalized relations with several Arab countries. Are these standardizations now being undermined?
For Morocco, the current context does not change anything, beyond the fact that the government does not wish to confront its public opinion on this subject, which is extremely angry against Israel. The recognition, by the United States, of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara is an achievement of diplomacy, as is the recognition, by Morocco, of the State of Israel. Which, moreover, only formalizes a factual situation which dates back to the 1950s.
For the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, it is business that has brought Israel closer to these Arab states. The latter prioritize their relations with the Jewish state, at the risk of discontenting their public opinion. At most, the Israel-Hamas war temporarily thwarts the promotion of interreligious and intercultural dialogue provided for by the Abraham Accords.
What about Saudi Arabia which, very recently, suspended a normalization process with Israel?
This suspension is mainly due to reasons independent of the conflict. On the one hand, although very tired and having given way to his heir, the king had always expressed his support for the Palestinians and therefore expressed reluctance about rapprochement with Israel. Then, when a Saudi diplomat was sent to the occupied territories last August, he gave up going to the Al-Aqsa mosque to pray, because he risked being stoned by the Palestinian population. This signal was probably perceived by the Saudi authorities.
Finally, there is this triangular deal with the United States, which was to promise a formal protection treaty to Saudi Arabia. But the Saudi cause is not very popular in the American Congress, where this agreement cannot be adopted without a two-thirds majority vote. Without forgetting the nuclear issue, Saudi Arabia wanting the United States to give it access to its technology…
Is this war the result of Israel’s rapprochement with Sunni Muslim countries, intended to curb Iran?
This is a likely objective of the October 7 attack, although I do not know what was being discussed in the Hamas political office. That said, I think that the primary goal of the latter was the taking of hostages to be negotiated against the release of five or six thousand Palestinian prisoners.
Is it true that the ruling class in Iran, and Hezbollah in Lebanon, support Hamas?
Yes. On a moral and material level. But I insist: we must not see anything other than the result of a strategic and political alliance. This dates from the time when Iran was fundamentally “anti Arafat” [the head of the Palestinian Authority at the time, enemy of Hamas, Editor’s note]. Then, in 2006, while Hezbollah was at the height of its popularity at the time of the war with Israel, the Egyptian government denounced Hamas as Shiite. It was grotesque, of course, but it meant that Hamas served as the Sunni guarantor of the Iranian political system. In 2011, Hamas broke away to support the Sunni revolution in Syria. Then, when he realized that the Syrian revolution had failed, he returned to the alliance with Hezbollah and Iran. But there are no terrible clandestine orchestra leaders plotting everything from the outside, as some people say.
So Iran did not orchestrate the October 7 attack?
I doubt. In all likelihood, neither Hezbollah nor Iran knew there would be an operation on October 7. At most, they suspected that Hamas was planning a big coup, because it was doing everything for that. But when you launch an operation of this kind, you make yourself as discreet as possible beforehand. We must keep in mind that each of these actors has their own autonomy of action and their own objectives.
Is there a risk of war in the short term with Lebanon and Syria?
First of all, you should know that, for months, the Israelis have been bombing Syria almost every two days. However, while there may be a risk of these tensions escalating, a war is not in Iran’s interests. Because Tehran’s primary concern is the risk of an Israeli attack on its nuclear potential. However, Hezbollah is part of the Iranian deterrence system: it must be preserved. This armed Shiite group does not want to involve Lebanon where it has its strength. In recent days, he has been doing minimum service there. At most, he threatens to launch operations, including with nominees, from Syria.
Gaza: where is the aid?
Thirty-three humanitarian aid trucks entered the Gaza Strip on October 29, which was under complete siege. In total, 117 trucks have been able to enter the Palestinian enclave since the start of the conflict – the majority containing medical equipment. While this level of aid proves to be woefully below needs, Israel is committed, according to a senior American official, to adjusting the control process to be able to process « 100 trucks per day », which corresponds to the request of the ‘UN. Fuel deliveries – essential to operating the generators that power hospitals – remain blocked, with the Jewish state claiming that Hamas would take advantage of them to manufacture weapons and explosives.
What does this war change for Egypt and Jordan?
Everyone is in trouble. Relations between Netanyahu’s government and King Abdullah II were already very bad: Jordan, which wants to have a role of guardian of the holy places in Jerusalem, protested vehemently against the encroachments of the Israeli government on the Mosques esplanade. She was also worried about the warming of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. And as a good half of its population is of Palestinian origin, its public opinion devotes total hatred to Israelis. Egypt has economic relations with Israel in the energy sector, which are based on a certain Egyptian reason of state. But an Islamist insurgency has been taking place in Sinai for around ten years. The permanent Egyptian anxiety is that Israel is expelling part of the population of the Gaza Strip. They are right: it is an idea that Israeli politicians have often said out loud. Then, early in the crisis, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken proposed that Egypt open its border so Palestinian refugees could shelter from Israeli fire. It drove the Egyptians almost crazy!
Is France’s proximity to Qatar likely to ease tensions in the region or increase them?
Qatar is not seeking to increase tensions. He’s doing his job, as usual. Its diplomatic niche is the negotiation of agreements with groups deemed to be inaccessible. Currently, he is discussing the hostage issue with Hamas.
In the medium term, what will be the effects of this conflict on the balance of power in the Middle East?
For public opinion throughout the Muslim world, the West is seen as carrying a hypocritical discourse that uses double standards and allows the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip to be massacred. Therefore, the more the Americans get involved, the more it weakens their position in the region. In addition, this benefits positions, not only Iranian, but also Chinese and Russian. Certainly, the Americans are the only ones who can send two nuclear aircraft carriers there. But their unpopularity grew to the point that they had their nationals evacuated from the region. We risk seeing the end of diplomatic relations between the United States and Iraq. It is an absolute disaster of American policy since 2003. It emerges that Israel was not an asset but a burden for all Westerners, contrary to the assertions of the entire Israeli strategy during the Cold War and beyond. of the.
And beyond the Middle East?
We are witnessing the weakening of the Ukrainian cause. Because when Emmanuel Macron wrote a tweet, a few months ago, explaining that bombing civilians is a war crime, and he did not send the same tweet in the face of today’s situation, This makes the Ukrainian cause unpopular in the Muslim world, and more difficult to support internationally. Finally, we see that the affair has repercussions within Western societies due to the community or confessional tension that manifests itself. The fundamental divide resurfaces between those who think about colonization/decolonization, and those who relate to the Shoah. You just have to look at the situation in France, the United Kingdom, Germany, the United States, to see how significant the internal repercussions are.
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